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cues. Muscimol injection could then be
used to ask whether animals could switch
between sensory representations from
moment to moment, as well as from month
to month.
Perhaps the most surprising thing
about the results of Chowdhury and
DeAngelis is that they surprise us. Visual
cortex is chock-full of cells sensitive to
binocular depth (Cumming and DeAnge-
lis, 2001; Orban, 2008). Why should we
expect cells in just one area to be critical
for depth perception? We can perhaps
trace the blame back to Lettvin et al.
(1959), the famous paper whose title
‘‘What the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain’’
implicitly asserts that signals from a neu-
ron selective for some feature exist de
facto to support behavioral responses to
that feature. But this is teleology. We
don’t learn the purpose of a neuron—or
an area full of neurons—by measuring its
selectivity. For that, we must make direct
measurements of the relationship be-
tween neuronal activity and behavior.
Put simply, even though neuronal signals
in some area may tell all we want to
know about some feature, that fact alone
is no reason to assume that the cells
downstream are actually listening.
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Humans have a natural ability to gain new insights by generalizing from previous experience. In this issue of
Neuron, Shohamy and Wagner reveal how generalizations naturally emerge during associative learning
through a partnership between putatively dopaminergic circuitry in the midbrain and the hippocampus.Deriving new knowledge from past expe-
riences can arguably be viewed as one of
the most far reaching capabilities of hu-
man memory. Niels Bohr, the venerated
Danish physicist, is an impressive exam-
ple: his first quantum model of the atom
published in 1913, is an innovative syn-
thesis of the ideas of Planck, Einstein,
and Rutherford. How, then, does the hu-
man brain accomplish such feats? In their
paper in this issue of Neuron, Shohamy
and Wagner (2008) approach an impor-
tant aspect of this puzzling question,
our ability to efficiently generalize past ex-perience to new situations, based on hid-
den threads that cut across multiple
events.
One possibility is that generalization is
accomplished when it is needed: that
means, when faced with a problem that
requires generalization, this calls into
play the effortful recall and subsequent
on-line manipulation and comparison of
individual exemplars or past experiences.
While empirical evidence suggests that
such ‘‘retrieval-based’’ generalizations may
be important in some situations (Heckers
et al., 2004), there is a more adaptiveNeuron 60and proficient way of achieving the same
goal: this is to detect and to encode gen-
eralizations as events around us unfold
over time and store these generalizations
as memories. The beauty of such a mech-
anism is that it makes generalizations
available when they are needed without
requiring the effortful ‘‘retrieval-based’’
route. The possibility of such a mechanism
is exciting, but so far its identity and
operating mechanisms have remained
elusive. Now, Shohamy and Wagner
(2008) have discovered such a mechanism
and termed it ‘‘integrative encoding.’’, October 23, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 197
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tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
in combination with a clever experimental
design. This involved combining the ac-
quired equivalence paradigm, a task
long favored by animal learning theorists,
with a conventional associative learning
paradigm. University students were pre-
sented with single images of faces (out
of 24 faces, from F1–F24) together with
two images depicting scenes (out of 24
scenes, from S1–S24) and learned by
trial-and-error which scene belonged to
which face. Critically, the authors incor-
porated an elegant twist in their design
to render pairs of faces (e.g., F1 and F2)
that were never presented together func-
tionally equivalent. They achieved this
through partial overlap: F1 was paired
with S1 and S2, and F2 was paired with
S1 (i.e., F1–S1, F2–S1, F1–S2). The idea,
therefore, was to render F1 and F2 equiv-
alent through their common association
with S1.
At the end of the learning phase partic-
ipants’ memory of the face-scene pairs
themselves (i.e., F1–S1, F2–S1, F1–S2)
was excellent (ca. 90% performance).
During the subsequent test phase, sub-
jects’ ability to generalize was assessed
by asking whether they would select S2
when confronted with F2. If so, this would
imply faces F1 and F2 had acquired equiv-
alence during training (that means they
have been linked with each other in mem-
ory), allowing them to generalize informa-
tion learnt about one stimulus (i.e., F1–S2)
to the other (i.e., F2–S2). As it turned out,
subjects were split in terms of their ability
to generalize in such a fashion: whereas
some performed very well (mean 96%
correct), others faired rather poorly
(mean 66% correct).
Interestingly, subjects who generalized
successfully selected S2 in response to
F2 very quickly, and recruited a similar
pattern of brain regions as that engaged
during trials involving previously seen as-
sociative pairings, arguing firmly against
the use of a slower effortful ‘‘retrieval-
based’’ reasoning strategy. Instead, par-
ticipants seemed to actually have the
generalizations readily stored in memory,
compatible with the ‘‘integrative encod-
ing’’ framework proposed by the authors.
With such a behavioral evidence for ‘‘in-
tegrative encoding’’ at hand, the authors
turned to the learning phase of their198 Neuron 60, October 23, 2008 ª2008 Elseexperiment to ask which brain regions
were involved. In fact, the large individual
variability in the performance on general-
ization (38%–100%) was best captured
by two brain regions whose activity in-
creased during learning: the hippocam-
pus and the substantia nigra/ventral teg-
mental area (SN/VTA) in the midbrain.
Intriguingly, activity in hippocampus and
SN/VTA was tightly coupled, suggesting
cooperativity in their contribution to suc-
cessful generalization performance.
The hippocampus and the SN/VTA are
no strangers to each other when it comes
to memory. The SN/VTA region harbors
neurons that synthesize the neurotrans-
mitter dopamine, and the activation of
this region therefore suggests that dopa-
mine may have influenced sites such as
the hippocampus. Joint activity of hippo-
campus and SN/VTA has been previously
observed in response to novelty for single
stimuli, associations between stimuli,
and when long-term memory for individ-
ual episodes is enhanced by rewards
(Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006; Wittmann
et al., 2005). Shohamy and Wagner’s find-
ings now indicate an exciting functional
extension what this couple can accom-
plish.
The principle findings of this study,
therefore, are that generalization relies
upon encoding-related processes sup-
ported by cooperative action between
the hippocampus and a putatively dopa-
minergic midbrain system. In the past,
researchers have tended to focus on the
role of the hippocampus in storing unique
experiences separately from one another,
in the service of episodic memory
(McClelland et al., 1995). While previous
work has established the role of the hip-
pocampus in generalization (e.g., (Myers
et al., 2003), primarily in the context of
transitive inference tasks (Heckers et al.,
2004), evidence has largely supported
the operation of logical inferential pro-
cesses at retrieval, that is the effortful,
‘‘retrieval-based’’ route. The current
study, therefore, advances the field by
providing convincing evidence of the im-
portance of ‘‘integrative encoding’’ mech-
anisms in the hippocampus to future gen-
eralization. As such, these findings yield
new insights into the function of the hu-
man hippocampus, favoring the idea that
it supports a so-called memory space
created through the linkage of multiplevier Inc.episodic traces through their common
features (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993).
Thinking back to Niels Bohr, the find-
ings raise the question as to what extent
these stored generalizations would lend
themselves for flexible use and decision
making. Interestingly, subjects who gen-
eralized successfully informally reported
that they had failed to notice that they
had never previously seen the novel pair-
ings presented in the probe trials (i.e.,
F2–S2). In future experiments, it would be
illuminating to probe subjects’ memory
of the associative structure of the stimuli
in a more explicit or challenging fashion
to understand how flexible generaliza-
tions acquired through the integrative
encoding mechanism actually are.
A particular highlight of the current
findings is that the hippocampus and the
SN/VTA were partners in ‘‘integrative en-
coding,’’ suggesting that the neurotrans-
mitter dopamine was involved. This points
toward an exciting synthesis among
cognitive-, molecular-, and systems-level
memory research with implications for
clinical conditions in which dopaminergic
neuromodulation is dysfunctional, such
as Parkinson’s disease and schizophre-
nia. At the same time, this raises two
acute questions regarding the specific
role of dopaminergic neurotransmission
in acquiring generalizations:
(1) What Is Driving the Activation
of the SN/VTA and, by Inference,
the Release of Dopamine?
With their ‘‘integrative encoding hypothe-
sis’’ the authors provide a compelling
framework that captures the putative in-
volvement of dopamine. This framework
is centered upon the assumption that
each event is not merely about learning
but also about detecting ‘‘what is miss-
ing’’ from previous events. On trials where
subjects view S1 and learn that it is asso-
ciated with F2, the memory of F1 is also re-
activated through its repeated pairing
with S1 on previous trials. This reactiva-
tion results in a mismatch, given that F1
is not actually present on the screen. An-
atomical and physiological evidence sug-
gest that the hippocampus is ideally
suited to detecting mismatches between
current sensory inputs and past experi-
ence (Kumaran and Maguire, 2007) and
relaying such signals to the SN/VTA, re-
sulting in what the authors call an
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SN/VTA areas is then viewed to trigger
a release of dopamine in the hippocam-
pus, thereby strengthening the encoding
of both past (i.e., F1) and present (i.e.,
F2–S1) features into an integrated repre-
sentation.
The appealing aspect about this frame-
work is that it captures the data very well:
first, it predicts that neural activity in the
hippocampus and midbrain would in-
crease from early to late stages of learning
because stronger mismatches would be
generated as learning of each face-scene
pair progresses. As the authors note
themselves, such increase in activity in
the course of learning is less than trivial:
in previous studies, a decrease in hippo-
campal activation is typically observed
as performance improves. Second, it con-
veniently agrees with an influential model
termed the hippocampal-VTA loop model
(Lisman and Grace, 2005), according to
which hippocampal mismatch signals
could trigger dopamine release in the hip-
pocampus by activating VTA dopamine
neurons.
The importance of Shohamy and Wag-
ner’s theoretical framework, therefore, is
in proposing a new function for hippocam-
pal mismatch signals and the hippocam-
pal-VTA loop more generally, namely cre-
ating integrated memory representations.
In contrast, previous work has empha-
sized the importance of mismatch signals
in alerting organisms to change in the en-
vironment (Kumaran and Maguire, 2006;
Kumaran and Maguire, 2007; Lisman
and Grace, 2005). One uncertainty, how-
ever, regarding the mismatch-based
framework is that it remains speculative
as to whether or not the presentation of
F2–F1 actually results in a mismatch for
F1. In future work, it will be important to
explore this issue more fully by character-
izing the fit between trial-by-trial changes
in neural activity and modeled prediction
error/mismatch signals.
Is there an alternative account as to
why dopamine may have played a role
here? One interesting possibility has to
do with the provision of positive and neg-
ative feedback after correct and incorrect
learning trials in this experiment. As sub-
jects improved their performance, well-
learned face-scene pairs may have be-
come predictive of positive feedback
which, by virtue of being as motivating
as the anticipation of a reward, may
have contributed to the engagement of
dopaminergic midbrain areas. As the au-
thors note, this brain region is best known
for its ability to code predictions and pre-
diction errors for rewards. Fortunately, it
should be fairly simple to test this ‘‘rein-
forcement-driven’’ hypothesis: unlike the
‘‘mismatch’’ hypothesis, it would predict
less SN/VTA involvement in an experi-
ment that did not involve feedback.
Furthermore, according to the reinforce-
ment-driven hypothesis, other monoam-
inergic modulators that also regulate
hippocampal plasticity, such as nor-
adrenaline (Frey and Frey, 2008), could
be called into play if instead of rewards,
emotional context were to modulate
learning.
(2) What Could Be the Mechanistic
Contribution of Dopamine to
Learning Generalizations?
This surely is the hardest and most spec-
ulative part of the findings. As the authors
point out, dopamine is well known to en-
hance hippocampal plasticity, and it
does so by inducing plasticity-related
proteins in synapses (Frey and Frey,
2008; Frey and Morris, 1998), the connec-
tion sites between neurons. However,
many researchers would argue that this
form of plasticity would contribute primar-
ily to long-term forms of memory (often re-
ferred to as consolidation; e.g., O’Carroll
et al., 2006) and may not necessarily
contribute to the rapid type of plasticity
required to acquire generalizations. To
further understand the link between mid-
brain activation and generalization, there-
fore, it would be illuminating to probe par-
ticipants’ memory after much longer
intervals, e.g., 24 hr.
Figure 1. Temporal Relationship between the Decay of Synaptic Tags (Glutamatergic)
and Experimental Trials (e.g., F1–S1 and F2–S1)
(A) If synaptic tags persist longer than the time interval between trials, associations can be acquired across
trials without dopamine.
(B) If synaptic tags decay faster than the inter trial interval (upper panel), then stabilization of these tags is
necessary, and dopamine release at each trial could accomplish just that by inducing plasticity related pro-
teins (lower panel). In that case, dopamine would directly contribute to the acquisition of generalizations.Neuron 60, October 23, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 199
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whether dopamine may in fact have
played any role in the acquisition of gener-
alizations in this experiment. As illustrated
in Figure 1, the answer to this question
may depend on the time scale over which
different plasticity related mechanisms in
the hippocampus interact: strengthening
a link between F1 and F2 through synaptic
plasticity will require so-called synaptic
tags which are induced by the neurotrans-
mitter glutamate and are likely to decay
rapidly (Frey and Frey, 2008; Govindara-
jan et al., 2006; Frey and Morris, 1998). If
their decay, however, is slower than the
time interval between overlapping pairs
(Figure 1A), they will be shared across tri-
als and event integration may proceed
without dopamine. In this case, dopamine
will only contribute to long-term memory
(O’Carroll et al., 2006) for the acquired
generalizations. If, on the other hand, syn-
aptic tags decay faster than overlapping
events occur, acquisition may be slowed
because these plasticity markers cannot
be shared across different trials (Fig-
ure 1B, upper panel). In this case, dopa-
mine released on each trial would,
through plasticity-related proteins, stabi-
lize the synaptic tags so as to make200 Neuron 60, October 23, 2008 ª2008 Elsthem available across different trials and
thus contribute to the rapid acquisition
of generalizations (Figure 1B, lower panel).
It should be possible to tease apart
these different scenarios by experimen-
tally manipulating time interval between
trials and the delay between acquisition
and test.
Insights, discoveries, and decisions
critically rely on our ability to detect hid-
den regularities in the world around us.
The study by Shohamy and Wagner
(2008) provides exciting new evidence
that memory is not merely a repository
of past experience but directly contrib-
utes to our natural ability to generalize.
Achieving a deeper understanding of this
process, at a biochemical and computa-
tional level, should keep a multidisciplin-
ary community of neuroscientists busy
for some time to come.
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